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Abstract 
The paper presents a risk-evaluation-based approach to the issue of 
interconnection between the earth electrodes of the MV/LV substations within 
MV networks. After a short introduction on the interconnection between earthing 
systems, the paper proposes four risk indexes defined starting from the safety 
requirements given by CENELEC HD 637 S1. 
     The indexes allow one to put in evidence, in a clear way, the benefits of the 
interconnection in terms of reduction of risk of critical electric shock for persons 
and of stress on the insulation of the LV devices in the presence of single line to 
earth faults and double earth faults inside MV/LV substations and single line to 
earth faults inside HV/MV stations. Moreover they can be used to identify in a 
simple way a Global Earthing System. 
Keywords:  risk indexes, electrical safety, global earthing systems. 
1 General problem 
Urban areas are characterized by earthing systems connected together so as to 
form a unique extended earthing system. An extended interconnection of earth 
electrodes can form a quasi-equipotential surface below the urban area, in which 
no dangerous voltages exist. In this case the interconnected earthing system can 
be defined “global earthing system” (GES in the following). The concept of GES 
was introduced for the first time in a normative document in 1999 [1] and, 
immediately it was clear its importance for electrical safety.  
     At a normative level, today, no universal criteria have been defined to identify 
a GES, but several distribution societies, private companies and research 
societies have given contributions to solve the problem [2–3]. All the methods 
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proposed by the distribution societies base the identification of GES on earth 
impedance measurements or on geometrical criteria. However, while the first 
methods prove to be very expensive, the second do not take into account all the 
elements that contribute to the creation of a GES and are based on practical 
experiences on the specific MV networks belonging to the different distribution 
societies and not founded on universal parameters. 
     In recent years the authors have proposed analytical methods to identify GES 
based on the calculation of the earth potentials within substations areas during 
different fault conditions and on the check of the safety limits imposed by 
technical standards [4–7].  
     In this paper are proposed four risk indexes, which together with the above-
mentioned analytical methods can be used to recognize in an absolute way 
dangerous situations inside interconnected earthing systems and to eliminate 
their causes so as to improve safety and to obtain a GES. 
2 Methodology 
An earth fault within a MV or a HV network give rise to the following risks: 
1. Electric shock risk for person due to  high touch voltages (step voltages 
are generally less dangerous), defined by: 
 
 ( )1 ( ) ( , )es p F es Tx FR S K t U t= − ⋅ ⋅δ  (1) 
 
2. Risk of excessive stress of the insulation of the LV equipments (only in 
TT-systems) due to high earth potential rises, defined by: 
 
 ( ) ( )1 ( , )is i F is E FR S K t U t= − ⋅ ⋅δ  (2) 
where: 
- (1-S) is the frequency of occurrence of the earth fault; 
- Kp is the probability of exposure of a person to a touch voltage during the 
fault; 
- Ki is the probability that the insulation of the electrical LV devices is 
exposed to the earth potential rise during the fault; 
- δes and δis are, respectively, the damage for person, function of the 
maximum value of the touch voltage and of the fault duration (UTx, tF) and 
the damage for the insulation of LV devices, function of the earth potential 
rise and of the fault duration (UE, tF). 
The permissible value of Res, indicated by ResA, is established on the basis of the 
typical values of (1-S) and Kp for MV and HV single line to earth fault, imposing 
a permissible damage δesA starting from the curves giving the danger of the 
current through human body as function of the fault duration [8]. Passing from 
the curve of the hazardousness of the body current, through the resistance of the 
human body, to the curve of hazardousness of the touch voltage as function of 
the fault duration, it’s possible to express ResA in the following way: 
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 ( )1 ( ) ( , )esA p F esA Tp FR S K t U t= − ⋅ ⋅δ  (3) 
 
In fig.1 the damage δes is represented as a function of UT for different values of 
the fault duration. According to CENELEC HD 637-S1 the admissible damage 
has been calculated assuming a probability of ventricular fibrillation equal to 
50%: (in terms of damage it may corresponds to δesA = 0.5: 50% of people can 
die as a consequence of the fault). 
 
 
Figure 1: Damage δes as function of UT. 
     Close to the admissible damage and for typical values of tF (no lower than 
100 ms), the curves represented in fig.1 can be approximated by straight lines 
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= ⋅  (5) 
 
     The permissible value of the risk for insulation, instead, is established on the 
basis of the maximum value of the earth voltage which the LV equipments 
insulation can stand and is given by: 
 
 ( )1 ( ) ( , )isA i F isA O FR S K t U t= − ⋅ ⋅δ  (6) 
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     In fig.2 is represented the damage δis as function of UE. The two curves 




Figure 2: Damage δis as function of UE. 
     Close to the admissible damage, the curves represented in fig.2 can be 
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where ν  is about 0.75. 














     Equations (5) and (8) suggest that the evaluation of Res and Ris can be done in 
a simply way by calculating the rates UTx/UTp and UE/UO. 
     If UTx/UTp≤1 for all the possible fault conditions, the system is safe (Res≤ResA) 
for person, if UO/UE≤1 for all the possible fault conditions, there are no dangers 
for the insulation of the LV devices (Ris≤RisA). 
     On the basis of this consideration it’s possible to define four risk indicators to 
evaluate the safety conditions of a given earthing system with reference to the 
following fault conditions: 
- single-line-to-earth fault inside a MV/LV substation (event E1) 
- single-line-to-earth fault inside a HV/MV station supplying a MV network 
(event E2); 
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- double-line-to-earth faults involving two MV/LV substations (event E3). 
These indicators, named relative risk index, are based on the assumption that as 
higher is the difference between the normative limit and the dangerous voltage 
due to a given event Ei (with i = 1,2,…), as lower is the risk related to that event. 
The first three indicators are related with danger of electric shock for person and 
























= ⋅  (9) 
 
where UTx,Ei is the highest value of the touch voltage within a substation area due 
to the event Ei and UTp,Ei is the permissible touch voltage related to event Ei 
duration. Since ResA and RisA have been defined with reference to the frequency 
of occurrence of a single line to earth fault, wD is a coefficient whose value is 
lower than 1, introduced to take into account the lower value of the frequency of 
occurrence (about 35%) of the double earth fault with respect to a single line to 
earth fault. 
     The fourth index is related to the insulation stress and, according to (8), is 
defined in the following way: 
 , 1 , 2 , 3
, 1 , 2 , 3
1 max ; ;
1
E E E E E E
D




   = ⋅ ⋅ − ν   − ν    
 (10) 
 
where UE,Ei indicates the earth potential rise within a substation area due to event 
Ei and UO,Ei, is the permissible voltages for insulation of the LV equipment 
calculated as function of the durations of the event Ei. 
     In table 1 are quoted the risk indexes that must be considered, for each 
substation, dependently from the state of the neutral point of the MV network 
(isolated neutral or resonant earthed neutral) and from the type of LV system 
earthing  (TT or TN). 
Table 1:  Table of the risk indexes. 
 Isolated Neutral Resonant  earthed neutral 
LV system TT TN TT TN 
S     
D*     
H**     
IS***     
* D must not be considered for resonant earthed neutral networks because the double 
earth fault in these networks is highly improbable (1-S3)≈0. 
** H must be considered only in presence of interconnected earthing systems and if the 
earth electrode of a HV/MV station is included in the interconnected earthing system. 
*** IS must be considered only if the neutral of the LV systems is connected to the 
earthing system of  the substation. 
 
     Using the four indexes it is possible to write (5) and (8) as follows: 
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 { }max ; ;es esAR S D H R= ⋅  (11) 
 is isAR IS R= ⋅   (12) 
 
     The diagram in fig.1 represents the procedure to evaluate the safety level of 
an interconnected earthing system in a MV network using the four indexes 
defined. 
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Figure 3: Evaluation of Res and Ris. 
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3 Application example 
The approach based on the calculation of the defined risk index has been applied 
to the network shown in figure 4. The network is made by 10MV lines and 
200MV/LV substations (20 per line). The distance between the substations is 


























Figure 4: Schematic representation of the network. 
     In the calculation three situations have been considered: earth electrodes of 
the substations isolated, connected through the metal sheaths of three-core MV 
cables or connected through bare buried conductors (cross-section 35mm2).  
     For the considered network the single line to earth fault current in the MV 
network is equal to 185A while the single line to earth fault current within the 
HV/MV station is equal to 10.5 kA. Depending on the events durations, the 
permissible touch voltages are UTp,E1 = 133V (tF,E1 = 690ms) for isolated earthed 
neutral network, UTp,E1 = 75V (tF,E1>>10s) for resonant earthed neutral network, 
UTp,E2 = UTp,E3 = 750 V (tF,E2 = tF,E3 = 100ms). 
     Specific coefficients, defined in [10], can be used for the calculation of touch 
and step voltages within substations areas starting from the earth potential rise 
UE. 
     Assuming that all the earth electrodes of the MV/LV substations have the 
same shape and dimensions (figure 5) and that the earth bulk resistivity is equal 
to 100Ωm, the highest value of the touch voltage can be calculated as follow: 
 
 0.3Tx E EU K U U= ⋅ = ⋅  (13)
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Figure 5: Shape of the earthing system of a substation. 
     In the following, the four risk indexes have been calculated for the 10th 
substation of a MV line in the case of: 
- single line to earth fault inside the substation; 
- double earth fault at substations 10 and 11 (worst situation for substation 10 
with reference to the double earth fault) ; 
- single line to earth fault inside the HV/MV station. 
Table 2:  Results of the simulations. 
 Isolated Neutral Resonant Earthed Neutral 
 S D H IS S D H IS 
Isolated earthing 
systems 2.09 1.21 -- 11.20 1.00 -- -- 1.00 
Interconnection 
by metal sheaths 0.15 0.20 0.047 0.65 0.061 -- 0.047 0.10 
Interconnection 
by bare buried 
conductors 
0.025 0.17 0.0023 0.39 0.033 -- 0.0023 0.022 
 Res Ris Res Ris 
Isolated earthing 
systems 2.09 ResA 11.20 RisA ResA RisA 
Interconnection 
by metal sheaths 0.20 ResA 0.65 RisA 0.061 ResA 0.10 RisA 
Interconnection 
by bare buried 
conductors 
0.17 ResA 0.39 RisA 0.033 ResA 0.022 RisA 
 
     Table 2 shows a typical example of what happens within an interconnection 
of earthing systems of substations during an earth fault. For all the situations the 
interconnection allows to obtain great advantages in terms of reduction of the 
risk indexes S, D and IS. In absence of interconnection the only way to make safe 
the earth electrode of the 10th substation is to reduce UE or UT, and both the 
solutions need an intervention on the structure of the earth electrode. 
     The use of bare buried conductors appears to be the must advantageous way 
to reduce all the risks due to the faults in the MV and HV networks. 
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4 Conclusion 
The construction of risk matrices whose elements are the relative risk indexes S, 
D, H and IS calculated for every MV/LV substation and for every fault situation 
in a given MV network, allows to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
interconnection between substations earthing systems. The risk matrices of a MV 
network are real risk maps for that network and can be used to have a clear 
vision of which substations are safer and which are, on the contrary, more easily 
influenced by the possible changes of the MV network. If all the elements of the 
matrices have values not over 1, the network is safe both for person and for the 
insulation of the LV devices. In particular, if all the elements of the risk matrices 




Figure 6: Earth potential rise at the substations (SS) due to an Event E2. 
Table 3:  Example of an S-risk matrix. 
Substation number S 
1 2 … N 
1 0.10 0.12 … 0.17
2 0.17 0.21 … 0.25








λ 0.19 0.19 … 0.22
 
     In a preliminary phase, using the new risk matrices deriving from a 
transformation of the MV network (expansion, reconfiguration, transformation 
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from aerial to cable line or vice versa), it’s possible to define if the 
transformation that is to be done can increase the risks for the network. 
     Moreover, the H-risk matrix can be used to establish if it’s possible to connect 
the earth electrode of the HV/MV station to the earth electrodes of the MV/LV 
substations. Indeed, such a connection is possible only if H is not higher than 1 
for all the substations belonging to the interconnected earthing system. 
     If all the substations earth electrodes are identical, the highest value of H can 
be calculated considering the first substation of every MV line outgoing the 
HV/MV station. Indeed, as figure 6 shows, the potentials transferred to the earth 
electrodes of the substations during an earth fault inside the station decrease as 
distance from the fault location. 
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